

Comparative Approaches to National and Economic Security in Selected States

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Abstract

National security increasingly depends on economic capacity and the ability to manage interconnected risks. This article compares policy approaches attributed to the United States, the European Union, Sweden, France, and China to identify how economic resilience is incorporated into broader security strategies. It uses a qualitative, comparative reading of the policy descriptions and secondary literature supplied for this study. The comparison applies four common dimensions: the definition of the protected interest, the role assigned to economic capacity, the preferred coordination mechanism, and the treatment of emerging risks. The cases show different emphases. The United States links economic strength to defense capability and international engagement; European integration emphasizes collective capacity and shared resources; Sweden foregrounds societal continuity and cooperation; France illustrates the coordination problem associated with multiple security actors; and China places particular weight on state-led strategic capacity and technological modernization. Across these approaches, economic security is best understood as a condition of institutional resilience rather than as economic growth alone. The article proposes an analytical framework for aligning economic policy, crisis preparedness, and security governance. Because the comparison relies on selective and partly historical materials, its findings are interpretive and should not be read as a current assessment of policy performance.

Keywords: national security; economic security; comparative policy; resilience; strategic governance; cybersecurity

Introduction

National security has expanded beyond the prevention of armed attack. Supply interruptions, infectious disease, organized crime, cyber incidents, and environmental disruption can compromise the capacity of institutions to protect the population and sustain essential services. Economic interdependence magnifies these risks: trade, finance, energy, and information systems connect domestic vulnerabilities to developments abroad. A national security strategy therefore depends not only on military readiness but also on the capacity of the economy and public institutions to absorb shocks and maintain critical functions.

The objective of this article is to compare how selected jurisdictions connect national and economic security. It asks which interests their strategies prioritize, how they mobilize economic resources, and what forms of coordination they use to respond to cross-border risks. The comparison does not rank countries. Its contribution is a common analytical structure that makes otherwise disparate policy descriptions comparable and identifies institutional lessons that can be considered in other settings (Fomin, 2010; Vlasenko, 2017).

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Literature Review

The relationship between national security and economic security has expanded beyond the question of whether a state can finance its armed forces. Economic capacity also affects the continuity of essential services, access to strategic resources, the ability to withstand external shocks, and the effectiveness of public institutions. Earlier studies approach this relationship through economic-security indicators, state management mechanisms, and comparisons of foreign policy experience (Fomin, 2010; Gordienko, 2013; Ignatova & Ryabova, 2016; Osmanov & Moiseev, 2015; Vlasenko, 2017). Taken together, these works provide a basis for examining economic security as part of national security, although they do not establish a single measure applicable to every country.

The United States offers an example of a security approach in which domestic economic strength and international engagement are closely connected. Its 1993 *National Security Strategy* addressed security interests within a broader political and economic setting, while Nanto (2011) examined how issues such as trade, finance, energy, innovation, and fiscal capacity may have implications for U.S. national security. These sources support an analysis of economic capacity as both a resource for security policy and a potential source of vulnerability. They are historical sources, however, and should not be treated as descriptions of current U.S. policy.

European approaches bring collective capacity and interdependence into the comparison. Nazarov (2021) examines Azerbaijan's place in European energy security, illustrating how the reliability of external supply can affect a region's security calculations. Sweden's 2017 national security strategy, meanwhile, provides a policy basis for considering the protection of society and cooperation alongside conventional defense. The EU, Sweden, and France should nevertheless be analysed as distinct cases: a regional framework and individual states do not have identical powers or coordination mechanisms.

Recent research extends the discussion to risks those cross sectoral and national boundaries. Moulay (2025) connects climate change with energy security and the difficulties of international cooperation. Safroui and Ammari (2025) examine the legal and political coordination needed to address climate change, while Tebra and Elagag (2025) show how geopolitical disruption can expose weaknesses in food supply. Aliyev (2025) links economic security and sovereignty to sustainable development in the Azerbaijani context. These studies suggest that economic resilience depends partly on the ability to maintain essential systems during a crisis, rather than on economic growth alone.

Digital threats add another dimension. Kodua (2026) examines changes in international security associated with cybersecurity, and Lomri et al. (2026) discuss evolving forms of cybercrime under globalization. Boukabache (2025) considers security governance through the narrower setting of digital transformation in academia. The latter study is useful for discussing institutional coordination, but its findings should not be generalized to an entire national security system without qualification.

The literature therefore identifies several connections between economic resources and security, but the sources cover different countries, sectors, and periods. This article organizes the comparison around four common questions: **what interest is protected, what role economic capacity plays, how institutions coordinate their response, and how emerging risks are addressed.** Applying those questions to the selected cases offers a structured interpretation of policy priorities. Because the source material is selective and includes historical documents, the comparison does not measure the current effectiveness of any country's security policy.

Conceptual Framework and Method

Economic security is treated here as the ability of a state and its institutions to sustain essential economic functions, preserve the material conditions of public welfare, and adapt to serious shocks. This working definition connects production, fiscal capacity, supply reliability, infrastructure, and institutional responsiveness. It also clarifies why economic security cannot be inferred from growth or defense spending alone: a productive economy may remain exposed if coordination fails or if critical dependencies are concentrated (Fomin, 2010; Ignatova & Ryabova, 2016).

The study is a qualitative comparison of five policy settings described in the supplied manuscript and its cited literature. It examines four dimensions in each case: (1) the protected interests and identified threats; (2) the place of economic resources in security policy; (3) domestic and international coordination; and (4) the handling

of technological or systemic risks. The United States, the European Union, Sweden, France, and China were selected because the supplied material presents contrasting approaches to state capacity, integration, and strategic planning. The European Union is a regional institution rather than a state; it is included as a distinct governance setting and is not treated as directly equivalent to its member states.

This is a conceptual synthesis, not a statistical test or an exhaustive review of current national strategies. Some source documents date from earlier policy periods, including the U.S. strategy identified as 1993 and the Swedish strategy identified as 2017. The discussion therefore reports the orientations represented in these materials and avoids treating them as verified descriptions of policy in 2025 or later.

Comparative Findings

United States

The U.S. approach described in the source material joins territorial protection and collective defense to economic strength and international engagement. Economic capacity matters because it funds defense, supports household welfare, and underpins technological innovation. The policy instruments identified in the manuscript include export controls, sanctions, fiscal choices, trade policy, and research and innovation. This suggests a broad understanding of security in which economic policy is both a resource base and a means of managing external dependence (Nanto, 2011; National Security Strategy of the United States, 1993).

The analytical tension is between openness and protection. Open markets and international exchange may raise prosperity, while strategic dependencies can create vulnerabilities. A coherent strategy therefore requires explicit criteria for determining which economic activities are critical and which risks can be managed through diversification, regulation, or alliances. The historical documents cited here cannot establish the present priority assigned to each instrument.

European Union

The EU setting illustrates the collective dimension of economic security. Integration allows participating states to coordinate standards, pool resources, and enlarge their market scale, potentially reducing some national vulnerabilities. At the same time, shared markets transmit disruptions across borders. Migration pressures, financial shocks, and geopolitical instability thus require coordination between EU-level institutions and member-state authorities. Economic security in this setting is a problem of both capacity and governance: common rules must be matched by practical arrangements for crisis response (Dergachyov & Vardomsky, 2011; Osmanov & Moiseev, 2015).

The source manuscript refers to Brexit and other developments as challenges to integration. These examples establish the historical context of the original discussion; they do not by themselves measure the effectiveness of a particular EU policy. The transferable lesson is the need to specify responsibilities before a shock exposes gaps between national and supranational decision-making.

Sweden

Sweden's cited 2017 national security strategy organizes security around the protection of life and health, the functioning of society, and fundamental democratic values. Its breadth makes economic continuity relevant even when framed under wider societal security. The approach also emphasizes cooperation across government and with regional and international partners, including work on cyber risks (National Security Strategy: Government Offices of Sweden, 2017).

This case illustrates an institutional design principle: critical services depend on shared responsibilities among public authorities, private operators, and citizens. Such coordination requires clear roles, information exchange, and preparedness arrangements. The cited strategy provides a historical policy reference rather than proof that a given coordination arrangement produced a measurable outcome.

France

The original manuscript depicts France as confronting military, geopolitical, and cyber challenges while facing difficulties in coordinating multiple security actors. These observations point to a general governance problem: spending and personnel alone are insufficient when responsibilities, planning horizons, or procurement priorities

are fragmented. The economic dimension includes the affordability of capabilities, the maintenance of infrastructure, and the domestic capacity to respond to disruptions.

Several specific statements in the original account—particularly personnel totals and the age of equipment—lack an identifiable source in the supplied reference list. They have therefore been excluded from this revised comparison. The French case is retained as an illustration of the importance of coordination, with no quantitative claim about present capabilities.

China

The China-focused material emphasizes strategic planning, military modernization, sovereignty, and technological capacity. It also identifies cyberspace, space, public health emergencies, and natural disasters as domains in which security risks may arise. This approach gives the state a central role in organizing capabilities and linking development objectives to national security (Gordienko, 2013; Nikitenko & Bulavko, 2009).

The comparison should not imply that all listed risks are unique to China. What distinguishes the orientation presented in the manuscript is the prominence of centralized strategic direction and the explicit connection between technological modernization and security capacity. The cited literature is insufficient to evaluate the effectiveness, costs, or contemporary configuration of those policies.

Cross Case Discussion

Four conclusions emerge from the common dimensions. First, the object of protection differs: territorial defense and international influence are prominent in the U.S. account, societal functioning in the Swedish account, integrated capacity in the EU account, coordination of diverse actors in the French account, and strategic state capacity in the Chinese account. These are differences of emphasis within broader security systems, not mutually exclusive categories.

Second, economic capacity is necessary but its institutional use determines its security value. Financial resources must be converted into reliable infrastructure, functioning supply chains, crisis reserves, technological capabilities, and effective public administration. Third, interdependence requires coordination across sectors and borders. Each case presents a different institutional route to such coordination, and none eliminates the need to identify responsibility for decisions under pressure. Fourth, cyber and technological risks make the boundary between civilian systems and national security increasingly porous. A failure in a critical service can affect economic welfare and public trust even without a conventional military attack.

These findings support a practical sequence for policy design: map essential economic functions and dependencies; identify plausible disruptions; assign lead institutions and escalation procedures; invest in preparedness and recovery; and review whether the arrangements work across agencies and borders. This sequence is a synthesis derived from the comparison, not a tested recommendation or a claim that the five cases implement identical measures (Savchuk et al., 2015; Vlasenko, 2017).

Limitations and Research Agenda

The comparison is limited by the selective nature and age of the available sources. It does not use a systematic search protocol, comparable national indicators, current primary policy documents for every case, or independent outcome measures. As a result, it cannot establish causal effects, rank resilience, or confirm the present legal and administrative status of any policy. Future research should define comparable indicators for supply continuity, fiscal response, cyber recovery, and interagency coordination, then test the proposed dimensions against current primary sources and observed crisis outcomes.

Conclusion

National and economic security are linked through the capacity to sustain essential functions when domestic or external conditions deteriorate. The five settings examined here organize that capacity differently, but all raise questions about the conversion of economic resources into coordinated and resilient institutions. The strongest generalizable insight is that economic strength alone does not guarantee security. Policy must connect material capacity to clearly assigned responsibilities, preparation for systemic disruption, and mechanisms for adjustment when threats change. The framework offered here provides a basis for more current and evidence-based comparative work.

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